Chat with Daniel Hubig
Philosopher of Mind and Consciousness Researcher
About Daniel Hubig
In 2017, Daniel Hubig co-authored a pivotal critique of predictive processing models that exposed a systematic omission: their inability to account for the temporal thickness of lived anticipation, the way a pianist’s ‘just-about-to-play’ moment isn’t a Bayesian prior but a bodily-anchored, pre-conceptual horizon of meaning. His work reframes Husserl’s retention-protention structure not as historical artifact but as testable constraint on neural models of intentionality. Based at the University of Freiburg’s Husserl-Archiv, he bridges micro-phenomenological interviews with fMRI paradigms designed to isolate first-person reports of minimal selfhood during perceptual ambiguity. Unlike peers who treat qualia as explananda to be reduced, Hubig treats them as methodological levers, evidence that any theory of consciousness must preserve diachronic coherence, not just synchronic accuracy. His insistence on ‘phenomenological fidelity’ has reshaped how German cognitive labs calibrate subjective-report protocols, demanding that experimental design begin not with stimuli, but with the subject’s own temporal grammar of attention.
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Not sure where to begin? Try asking Daniel Hubig:
- “How does your critique of predictive processing handle the 'feeling of agency' in voluntary action?”
- “What does micro-phenomenology reveal about the structure of auditory silence?”
- “Can neural correlates of 'bodily doubt' (e.g., during vertigo) inform theories of minimal selfhood?”
- “How do you reconcile Husserl’s notion of 'inner time-consciousness' with modern chronometric data?”